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1 Sixty years after the retreat to Taiwan of the Nationalist army, the question of Taiwan
still remains important and has even, on various occasions, been defined as the only
problem that could lead to direct confrontation between the great powers in the post-
Cold War period. As Alan Watchman sees it, the heart of the question of Taiwan centres
on what he calls the Shi Lang paradigm (p. 112), which has prevailed since the end of
the  seventeenth  century.  From  this  perspective,  control  over  Taiwan  seems  to  be
necessary for mainly defensive reasons: whether as a source of rebellion, a port — and
later what General Mac Arthur called “an unsinkable aircraft carrier” — in the hands of
a rival power, or simply left to its own devices, the island is a constant threat to the
south-eastern provinces of mainland China. To Alan Wachman, this singularity in the
position of Taiwan explains the extreme rigidity of China’s position. He emphasises the
unconvincing  nature  of  the  arguments  linking  the  latter  to  the  exacerbation  of
nationalist  feeling  on  the  mainland  or  Beijing’s  attachment  to  territorial  integrity.
Quite  clearly,  while  the  categorical  imperatives  (p.  38)  of  sovereignty  and national
unity  should  have  forbidden  any  “losing”  negotiation  in  the  range  of  territorial
disputes  involving  Beijing,  “China  has  settled  fourteen  of  its  frontier  disputes
peacefully, largely through offering substantial compromises to its neighbours.”1
2 Alan Wachman’s argument is based on detailed analysis of the position occupied by
Taiwan in the mental  map of  China (p.  47).  Thus he emphasises  the appearance of
Taiwan on this map after the submission of the heirs of Zheng Chenggong, thanks to
Shi Lang’s intervention with Kangxi,  who had originally shown little interest in the
island (p. 55). Wachman points out that this “integration” of Taiwan into China was
carried out  then for  reasons connected with the security  of  the  mainland’s  coastal
provinces, and even this unification appeared to be only partial, with a line from north
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to south dividing an area of the island under real control from a zone under nominal
control. Soejima used the lack of clarity surrounding Beijing’s real sovereignty over the
island and the lack of control over the aboriginal population as a pretext to justify
Japanese  intervention.  Taiwan  then  became  more  clearly  at  stake  in  the  rivalry
between two great powers, one on the decline, the other rising fast.
3 Alan Wachman underlines  the  fact  that  a  consequence  of  the  break  caused by  the
Treaty of Shimonoseki was a fading of Taiwan from this “mental map“ of China. Sun
Yat-sen, and initially Chiang Kai-shek as well as Mao Zedong, expressed little interest in
Taiwan,  not to mention in any later annexation.  Wachman emphasises that the re-
emergence of a claim over Taiwan, almost half a century after the island was ceded to
Japan, was closely linked to anxiety over the security of the mainland. Beginning in
1941-42, both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) saw Taiwan as a
buffer zone that offered essential  guarantees for the security of  the future Chinese
state.
4 Chapter  6  sails  into  more  familiar  waters,  recalling  the  geostrategic  bases  of  the
question of Taiwan at the beginning of the Cold War. President Truman’s decision to
neutralise the Taiwan Strait by sending in the Seventh Fleet, for fear that any hostilities
would mark the beginning of a vast Communist offensive, established the rules of the
game for decades to come. Wachman emphasises that the CCP, recently victorious on
the mainland, perceived this move not only as the touchstone of counter-revolutionary
containment, but also as a substantial threat to the coast of the People’s Republic. The
confirmation of a strong link between Taiwan and Washington after the Korean War
increased Beijing’s fears as well as giving lasting definition to the basic structure of the
question of Taiwan. Despite important changes in the regional and global environment,
Taiwan has  remained a  central  stake in  the  rivalry  between the  United States  and
China,  with the importance of  the island to  the latter  still  linked to  the “Shi  Lang
paradigm.”
5 Taiwan’s  place  in  the  “imagined  geography”  of  the  People’s  Republic  in  the
contemporary period remains, to the author, deeply influenced by anxiety over Chinese
vulnerability. On top of this “defensive” dimension, however, comes a more “offensive”
interest. Taiwan appears as a point of entry to the Pacific, the only access point in the
first chain of islands that does not impinge on the claims of any other state. From this
point of view, Taiwan’s importance seems crucial as the key to accessing naval power
and thus great power status. Alan Wachman highlights in particular constant reference
to the pioneering work of Alfred Mahan in the arguments put forward by the majority
of  Chinese  military  analysts.  More  than  ever,  perhaps,  Taiwan  appears  as  the
cornerstone in the construction of a China restored to power and status. Based on a
strategic continuity,  Alan Wachman’s book presents itself  as a powerful  antidote to
belief in an exclusive “identity” basis to the question of Taiwan. However, resorting to
the notion of “imagined geography” remains less convincing to the extent that the
relationship between geography and the balance of power rests on relatively tangible
bases — such as the deployment of two naval air force groups close to Taiwan by the
Clinton Administration in the spring of 1996. Wachman’s line of reasoning on Chinese
naval  power  also  remains  problematic  to  the  extent  that  control  of  Taiwan  is  of
marginal importance to the security of Chinese maritime communication links,  and
that the modernisation of the structure of Chinese naval forces shows specificities — in
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particular  a  trend towards denial  of  access  — that  remain difficult  to  relate to the
explanations provided by Wachman’s book.
6 Translated by Michael Black
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